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The Evolution of Strong Reciprocity
Abstract
A number of outstanding puzzles in economics may be resolved by recognizing that where members of a group benefit from mutual adherence to a
social norm, agents may obey the norm and punish its violators, even when
this behavior cannot be motivated by self-regarding, outcome-oriented preferences. This behavior, which we call strong reciprocity, is a form of altruism
in that it benefits others at the expense of the individual exhibiting it. While
economists have doubted the evolutionary viability of altruistic preferences,
we show that strong reciprocity can invade a population of non-reciprocators
and can be sustained in a stable population equilibrium. Under assumptions
that may reflect the relevant historical conditions, the model describes the
genetic evolution of strong reciprocity as a component in the repertoire of
human preferences.

1

Introduction

While the assumption of self interested action has proven a remarkably powerful
behavioral foundation for economics, a number of important social phenomena
are difficult to explain on this basis. Among these are the importance of fairness
motives in wage setting and other exchanges involving strategic interaction (Blinder and Choi 1990, Bewley 1998), the extensive support for welfare programs
even among those who cannot expect to be net beneficiaries (Gilens 1996, Luttmer
1998, Gilens 1999, Fong 2000, Piketty 1999) and the effectiveness of group incentives even where residual claimancy is shared among such a large number that
the individual gains associated with one’s own effort is vanishingly small (Ghemawat 1995, Hansen 1997, Knez and Simester 1998). Experiments by economists
and psychologists have provided further evidence that in some situations nonselfish
motives are robust predictors of behavior (Fehr and Gächter 2000, Fehr and Falk
1999, Kahneman, Knetch and Thaler 1986, Güth and Tietz 1990, Hoffman, McCabe and Smith 1998, Isaac, Walker and Williams 1994). While this evidence can
be variously interpreted, we think it provides sufficient reason to consider a broader
range of human motivations.
These studies suggest that where members of a group benefit from mutual
adherence to a social norm, individuals may obey the norm and punish its violators,
even when this behavior cannot be justified in terms of standard preferences. We
call this strong reciprocity. We distinguish this from contingent cooperation in an
indefinitely repeated game and other forms of mutually beneficial cooperation that
can be accounted for in terms of self-interest. Compelling evidence for the existence
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and importance of strong reciprocity comes from controlled laboratory experiments,
particularly the study of public goods, common pool resource, trust, ultimatum, and
other games (Fehr and Gächter 1999), from the ethnographic literature on simple
societies (Knauft 1991, Boehm 1984, Boehm 1993), from historical accounts of
collective action (Moore 1978, Scott 1976) , as well as from everyday observation.
Strong reciprocity confers group benefits by promoting cooperation and punishing free riding. However such behavior imposes individual costs, both because
strong reciprocators contribute more to the group than selfish types, and because
they sustain the costs of punishing free riders. Thus where benefits and costs are
measured in fitness terms and where the relevant behaviors are governed by genetic
inheritance subject to natural selection, it is generally thought that, as a form of
altruism, strong reciprocity cannot invade a population of non-reciprocators, nor
can it be sustained in a stable population equilibrium. We show that this is not the
case, and offer an evolutionary explanation of the phenomenon.
We do not address the empirical question concerning the degree to which observed strongly reciprocal behavior is genetically as opposed to culturally based.
Rather, we answer the question: could such behavior have a genetic basis—beyond
the obvious requirements on the cognitive capacities of individuals. As the late
Pleistocene is the only period long enough to account for a significant development in modern human gene distributions, we base our model on the structure
of interaction among members of the small hunter-gatherer bands in this period,
which constitutes most of the history of Homo sapiens, as revealed by historical
and anthropological evidence.1
Here we propose an explanation based on the fact that strong reciprocity supports
high levels of mutual monitoring within groups, and for this reason groups with
large numbers of reciprocators have superior average levels of fitness. Despite the
individually costly nature of monitoring and punishing, strong reciprocity can then
evolve because of the greater likelihood that reciprocators will be in groups with
effective mutual monitoring. This greater likelihood derives from the fact that norm
violators, reciprocators and non-reciprocators alike, are occasionally ostracized,
and non-reciprocators are more likely to be norm violators. Formally, we model a
dynamical system in which genetically inherited preferences explain individual (not
necessarily fitness-maximizing) behaviors, and population frequencies are governed
by a fitness-based replicator dynamic derived from within-group interactions in a
public goods game as well as migratory flows among groups.
We provide a population-level equilibrium in which strong reciprocity persists
even though non-reciprocators have greater fitness when interacting with reciproca1As the mechanics of genetic determination and its associated inheritance process are not germane
to our model, we leave this issue unexplored, assuming that offspring are clones of a single parent.
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tors, and non-reciprocators may form a considerable fraction of the population (20%
in a simulation we discuss below). We are also able to offer a plausible account
of the successful invasion and diffusion of reciprocity behaviors in a population
of non-reciprocators. Under assumptions which we think may reflect the relevant
historical conditions, the model thus describes the genetic evolution of reciprocal
preferences.
Our model has several characteristics similar to other accounts of reciprocity.
The behaviors we seek to explain, while formally altruistic—that is individually
costly and group beneficial—are more punishing than kind, a characteristic shared
by Trivers (1971), Hirshleifer and Rasmusen (1989), Boyd and Richerson (1992),
Sethi and Somanathan (1996) and Friedman and Singh (1999).2 Like Binmore
(1998) we use evidence on the evolution of humans in foraging bands to study the
influence of reciprocity concerns on the nature of equilibria in public goods games,
but unlike Binmore we explore the evolution of non-self-regarding preferences in
these environments. And like Güth and Yaari (1992), Huck and Oechssler (1996),
Bester and Güth (1998) and Friedman and Singh (1999), we distinguish between
utility, which affects behavior, and fitness, which affects rates of reproduction.
Our approach is also distinctive in two respects. First, while most models of
reciprocity use repeated interactions among pairs of agents to induce cooperative
behavior (Boorman and Levitt 1980, Axelrod and Hamilton 1981, Kreps, Milgrom,
Roberts and Wilson 1982, Axelrod 1984, Boyd and Lorberbaum 1987, Guttman
1996), we treat social interaction as a series of one-time events in which no new
knowledge is acquired from the events of the previous periods, and we assume that
relatively large groups of agents interact.
Second, our model is based on group membership rather than genetic relatedness, as in Samuelson (1983), Bergstrom and Stark (1993), and Bergstrom (1995).
However, unlike other models of this type (Robson 1990, Güth andYaari 1992, Güth
1995) we do not assume reciprocators can be distinguished from non-reciprocators
by some phenotypic trait, nor can individuals establish reputations by their behaviors. Rather, in our model reciprocators are more likely to be in groups with other
reciprocators because they have a lower frequency of norm violation, and hence are
less likely to be ostracized for misbehavior.
If our model is to account for the evolution of strong reciprocity in humans it
should capture the social and physical environment of the foraging bands that made
up most of human society for most of its history. While modern accounts of these
societies record considerable variety in social organization and livelihood (Kelly
2 Sethi and Somanathan’s paper is most closely related with our work, but our reciprocators do

not use weakly dominated strategies, so our model can support a positive (indeed, quite high) level
of non-cooperation in equilibrium. We believe a high frequency of non-cooperation is in fact found
in both simple and contemporary societies.
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1995), the widespread sharing of food, valuable information, and other sources of
survival among many of these societies in the modern world is well established
(Woodburn 1982). Strong reciprocity, including spontaneous sharing and the sanctioning of those who violate sharing norms, provides a parsimonious explanation.
Punishing norm violators deters free riding and hence explains both sharing and
working to acquire goods that later would be shared.
The evolutionary puzzle is not why group members work and share, but rather
why they punish. To address this problem, we develop a team production model
in which it is costly both to follow a work norm and to punish norm violators.
Our model captures key of characteristics of small foraging bands.3 First, groups
are sufficiently small that members directly observe and interact with one another,
yet sufficiently large that the problem of free riding in team production is present.
Second, there is no centralized structure of governance (state, judicial system, Big
Man, or other) so the enforcement of norms depends on the voluntary participation of
peers. Third, there are many unrelated individuals, so altruism cannot be explained
by inclusive fitness. Fourth, status differences are quite limited, especially by comparison to horticultural and later industrial societies, which justifies our treatment
of individuals as homogeneous other than by reciprocator/non-reciprocator type
and by the group to which they belong. Fifth, the sharing on which our model of
team production is based—either of food individually acquired or of the common
work of acquiring food—is characteristic of these societies. Sixth, hunter-gather
bands experience high membership turnover, justifying our abstraction from reputation effects and repeated interactions as means of norm enforcement. Finally
the only intertemporal relationships in our model concern fitness: the individuals
in our model do not invest—store food or accumulate resources—and this too is a
characteristic of at least those hunter-gather bands based on what Woodburn (1982)
calls an “immediate return” system of production.
In Section 2 we model the actions of members of a single group and define a set
of Nash equilibria representing their behaviors. We then turn from the behaviors
of members within groups to their reproductive success, addressing in Section 3
the rate of change of genetically different types within groups and in Section 4 the
distribution of types in the larger population. We then we ask if this model might
explain the evolution of strong reciprocity among the hunger-gatherer foragers of
the late Pleistocene.
3 We have relied on the following sources: Balikci (1970), Lee (1979), Cashdan (1980), Woodburn

(1982), Boehm (1982), Kaplan, Hill, Hawkes and Hurtado (1984), Kaplan and Hill (1985b), Kaplan
and Hill (1985a), Blurton-Jones (1987), Woodburn and Barnard (1988), Endicott (1988), Kent (1989),
Knauft (1989), Knauft (1991), Hawkes (1992), Boehm (1993), Hawkes (1993), Damas (1972) Kelly
(1995).
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Equilibrium Working, Shirking and Punishing Within a Group

Consider a group with n members. Members may either work or shirk. If all shirk,
they all have equal fitness φa , which we define as the number of replicas produced
per individual minus one, or equivalently, the rate of growth the population in
question. We assume φa < 0, so a group shrinks over time if its members all shirk.
If there is no shirking, and if output is divided equally among members, each will
have positive fitness.
However group members benefit from shirking while still sharing equally in the
total production of the group. To model this, we suppose each member can either
work, supplying one unit of effort, or shirk, supplying
n zero units of effort. Let σj
be the probability that member j shirks, so σ = j =1 σj /n is the average rate of
shirking. We assume output is additive over group members, so the fitness value
of group output is n(1 − σ )q, where q is the output of one working member. We
explore the case where output is shared equally, so each member gets (1 − σ )q. The
loss to the group from one member shirking is q, while the gain to a member is the
fitness cost of effort, b > 0, which we assume is identical for all group members,
and q > b.
We assume that n is sufficiently large that q/n < b, so if there is no policing
of free riders, shirking would promote a member’s fitness whether or not the other
members work or shirk.However we suppose that a group member can be monitored
by other members of the group, and if detected shirking, can be punished. Suppose
the cost to a member of monitoring another member is c > 0 and a shirking
member who is monitored will be detected and punished with probability p ∈ (0, 1].
Punishment consists of sustaining a cost s > 0, and being ostracized from the group.
The group now faces a ‘second order free rider problem’: it is costly to monitor
and to punish, so each member would like the others to monitor and punish, but
suffers material losses by doing so himself. Suppose, however, the group consists of
two type of actors. The first type maximizes fitness, and therefore never punishes,
and only works if the cost of being detected and punished is sufficiently high that the
fitness costs of shirking exceed the fitness benefits. The second type, whom we call
reciprocators, are motivated not only by fitness considerations, but also a subjective
utility ρ from punishing shirkers, as well as by a concern for the well-being of other
reciprocators. To capture the latter, we assume reciprocators experience a disutility
of labor that is declining in the fraction f of the group which is reciprocators or, for
simplicity, b−f .4 We assume both types are homogeneous. We assume throughout
that ρp > c, so the expected subjective benefits from punishing shirkers exceed
4 We assume f is common knowledge, but group members cannot tell the type of individual fellow

members. Our model is changed little if we assume the disutility of labor is simply b − .
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the cost of monitoring a shirker. We call the fitness-maximizers non-reciprocators.
Finally, we assume that the utility of punishment accrues to reciprocators only if the
level of cooperation in the group is strictly positive (this eliminates the uninteresting
‘masochistic’ equilibrium in which no one works and nevertheless reciprocators
punish).
The introduction of reciprocators solves the second order free rider problem only
by displacing it to the following question: How might the behaviors associated with
preferences that are not fitness-maximizing—namely those associated with ρ and
—have evolved under the influence of natural selection operating on genetically
transmitted traits? To answer this we explore whether individuals with these preferences might enjoy an average level of fitness as great as the fitness-maximizing
non-reciprocators. Thus, we will have to distinguish between individual utilities,
which regulate behaviors, and levels of fitness, which determine the evolution of
the composition of the population. When we refer to payoffs, we mean the utilities,
which only in the case of non-reciprocators is equivalent to fitness.
We assume a non-reciprocator cannot be distinguished from a reciprocator.
While the act of shirking is observable, the type of a shirker need not be deducible
therefrom. Moreover, since shirkers are ostracized, members do not accumulate
information concerning other members’s behavior in previous periods, so we are
free to assume that all group members are monitored equally. Moreover, our homogeneity assumptions imply that there will be a common rate of monitoring µ in
equilibrium for all reciprocators, while non-reciprocators do not monitor. There will
also be a common rate of shirking σr for reciprocators and σn for non-reciprocators,
so if the proportion of reciprocators is f , we have
σ = f σr + (1 − f )σn .

(1)

If a reciprocator monitors, the likelihood of detecting a non-reciprocator shirking
is σn p, and the corresponding likelihood for a reciprocator is σr p so the expected
net cost of monitoring is5
c − (pρf σr + pρ(1 − f )σn ) = c − pσρ.

(2)

For simplicity, we assume the probability that a shirker is detected not working
when each of the reciprocators monitors at rate µ is linear in total monitoring, and
5 To be exact, we should take into account the fact that no member can monitor himself, so the

correct formula is



c − p f σr + (1 − f )sn ρ.

where f = (f n − 1)/n. To simplify the exposition, however, we will assume n is sufficiently large
that we can replace f by f in our calculation, after which the previous expression simplifies to the
above expression.
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so equals f nµp. Writing the gain to a non-reciprocator from shirking as the cost
of working minus the foregone share of output, we have
gn = b −

q
.
n

(3)

Given s, we can write the expected non-reciprocator gain from shirking as gn −
f nµps. Reciprocators gain b − q/n − f from shirking, so gr = gn − f . Then if
σn and σr are chosen by reciprocators and non-reciprocators as best responses, we
have


gn < f nµps
gr < f nµps
 = 0,
 = 0,
σn ∈ [0, 1], gn = f nµps
σr ∈ [0, 1], gr = f nµps .
(4)


= 1,
gn > f nµps
= 1,
gr > f nµps
We assume that gr < 0 when f = 1, so that universal cooperation holds in a group
of reciprocators with no monitoring. However for f < 1, any Nash equilibrium
involves positive shirking, since if σ = 0 then pρσ < c, so µ = 0, so the cost of
shirking is zero, and since gn > 0, it follows that σn = 1 so σ > 0 by (1), which
is a contradiction. Thus we must investigate conditions under which 0 < σ < 1 in
equilibrium. We shall assume throughout that (a) pρ > c, so that unless σ = 0,
reciprocators monitor when the probability of detecting shirking is sufficiently high;
(b) b > q/n, so that non-reciprocators will shirk if there is no punishment; and (c)
b < q/n + , so that in a group of all reciprocators there zero shirking even without
punishment.
As described in Proposition 1 in the Appendix, this model has several possible
equilibria, depending on the relationship between the fraction f of reciprocators
and the various model parameters. To simplify the analysis, we shall assume the
following inequality which, as shown in the Appendix, eliminates only implausible
and uninteresting regions:
c
gn
+
> 1.
pρ
nps + 

(5)

We then have
Theorem 1. Under the stated assumptions the following cases are nonempty and
exhaustive.
(a) If f < gn /(nps + ) then σ = σr = σn = 1 and µ = 0. This is the
asocial equilibrium in which all members shirk and there is no monitoring or
punishment;
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1 c
− (1 − f ) ,
σr =
f pρ

9

(6)

so σ = c/pρ and µ = gr /f nps. This is the social equilibrium in which
non-reciprocators do not work and reciprocators have positive shirking, while
monitoring with less than certainty;
(c) If gn / < f , then σn = 1, σr = 0, σ = 1 − f and µ = 0. This is the
unconditional cooperation equilibrium in which reciprocators never shirk
and never monitor, while non-reciprocators shirk with certainty.
This theorem follows directly from Proposition 1 in the Appendix, since the other
cases mentioned in the theorem violate (5).

3

Group Level Equilibrium

We have identified Nash equilibria for the behaviors of members in groups with
given frequencies of reciprocators. Under what conditions will the within-group
frequency of reciprocators be stationary? To explore the population dynamics within
the group for the three cases identified by Theorem 1, we turn from the behavioral
analysis involving utilities, to a reproduction analysis involving fitness. We will
see that the frequency of reciprocators in the group may be stationary despite the
greater within-group fitness of the non-reciprocators. The reason is that while nonreciprocators produce more replicas, some are expelled from the group, and there
is some frequency of reciprocators for which the level of ostracism is sufficient
to offset the greater fitness of non-reciprocators, leading to stationarity of f . We
will account for those ostracized subsequently, when we study to evolution of the
distribution of types not in a single group, but in the population as a whole.
Let πr and πn be the rate of change of the reciprocators and non-reciprocators in
a social group per time period taking account of the numbers lost through ostracism.
Then if the fraction of reciprocators is ft at time t, we have
ft+t =

ft (1 + πr t)
.
ft (1 + πr t) + (1 − ft )(1 + πn t)

Subtracting ft , dividing by t, and passing to the limit, we get
dft
= ft (πr − π ) = ft (1 − ft )(πr − πn ).
dt

(7)
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dπr
dπn
<
.
dft
dft

(8)

When f is in the social region, all agents receive fitness benefits q(1 − σ ) as
their share of group output while reciprocators bear a fitness cost of b(1 − σ ) for
working and µcn for monitoring. The fitness costs occasioned by the punishment of
shirking, which are born by all non-reciprocators and σr of reciprocators, is sf npµ
which, using (4), we can express as gr . The fitness of each type when in social
groups is thus given by
φns = q(1 − σ ) − f npµ

φrs = q(1 − σ ) − f npµσr − b(1 − σr ) − µcn,

and the fitness advantage of the non-reciprocator group members over the reciprocators is then (σr − 1)gr + b(1 − σr ) + µcn. The expected contribution of each
group member to the group’s population in the next period is equal to their fitness
minus the probability of ostracism if shirking, which is f npµ = gr /s. Thus
πn = φns − f npµ,
πr =

φrs

− σr f npµ.

(9)
(10)

Equating the two rates of increase, we find that the only equilibrium in the region
is given by
gn
bs(1 − σ )
f∗ =
−
.
(11)

((1 − σ )(1 + s) − σρ)
Also

d
((1 − σ )(1 + s) − σρ)
.
(πr − πn )|f ∗ = −
df
sf ∗

(12)

Since f ∗ < gn /, the denominator in the second term in (11) must be positive.
Therefore the numerator in (12) is positive, so the equilibrium is stable. In the
unconditional cooperation region all members receive qf , but reciprocators pay b
for working while non-reciprocators do not. Therefore πr −πn = −b in this region,
so the fraction f of reciprocators declines through the region. Figure 1 illustrate
the within group dynamics and the stable equilibrium in the social region.
Figure 2 illustrates the stable equilibrium for a social group for a particular
choice of the model’s parameters (c, ρ, s, b, q, n, p, ). The size of the group in
the example and the other parameters have been deliberately chosen to make shirking
highly fitness-beneficial for those who escape punishment and thus to illustrate a
case in which both types are represented at substantial frequencies and shirking is
not uncommon in the resulting equilibrium. The values are stationary in two senses.
April 14, 2000
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Asocial
Equilibrium
σ n = σr = 1
µ=0
σ =1

0
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Social
Equilibrium
σn = 1, σr = 0
r
µ = f gnps
c
σ = pρ

Unconditional
Cooperation
σn = 1, σr = 0
µ=0
σ =1−f

f∗
gn /(nps + )

gn /

1.0

f

Figure 1: Within-Group Dynamics:df/dt = πr (f ) − πn (f ), so f = f ∗ is
a stable equilibrium with basin of attraction (gn /(nps + ), 1], and
f = 0 is neutrally stable for f < gn /(nps + ).

First, the behaviors of the individuals are best responses and so the outcome is a Nash
equilibrium for the within-group population frequency f ∗ . Second, the frequency
of each type is stationary under the replicator dynamic (12), the differential fitness
of the non-reciprocators being offset by their greater likelihood of being ostracized.

4

Population Dynamics and Equilibrium

It remains to show that the fraction of reciprocators in the population, has a timeinvariant equilibrium value, despite the fact reciprocators have lower fitness than
non-reciprocators when the two types interact in a social group. To do this we first
show that in equilibrium the composition of the social and asocial groups differ
with reciprocators constituting a larger fraction in the former, and then show that
population level average fitness of the two types is equalized at a positive value τ .
We assume the population consists of social and asocial groups. We assume all
social groups are of size n > 1, and we ignore unconditional cooperation groups
since they lie in the basin of attraction of the social groups. We assume social groups
are in internal equilibrium as described in the previous section, with f ∗ being the
fraction of those in social groups who are reciprocators, given by (11). We also
define f∗ to be the fraction of those in asocial groups who are reciprocators. We
have f∗ < gn /(nps + ), but the value of f∗ is yet to be determined. We can express
the fraction τ of reciprocators in the population as
τ = αf ∗ + (1 − α)f∗ ,

(13)
April 14, 2000
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Variable

Value

µ
σr
σn
σ
f∗
φrs
φns
f npµσr
f npµ
πr
πn

0.013
0.501
1.000
0.600
0.802
0.095
0.100
0.005
0.011
0.090
0.090

12

Description
Monitoring Rate by Reciprocators
Shirking Rate by Reciprocators
Shirking Rate by Non-Reciprocators
Average Shirking Rate
Frequency of Reciprocators
Fitness of Reciprocators
Fitness of Non-Reciprocators
Rate of Ostracism of Reciprocators
Rate of Ostracism of Non-Reciprocators
Rate of growth of Reciprocators in Group
Rate of growth of Non-Reciprocators in Group

Figure 2: Equilibrium Working, Shirking, and Punishing in the Social Region.
The equilibrium for this region is generated using the following parameter values: n = 40, q = 0.25, s = 0.0052, b = 0.011, p = 0.025,
ρ =  = b/2, c = 0.000079.

Let −β be the immigration rate into social groups that maintains group size, so
that

β = −πr (f ∗ ) = −πn (f ∗ ).

(14)

We assume members ostracized from a social group migrate to asocial groups.
Also, if β < 0 (social group population is increasing), |β|n members of each social
group migrate to form new social groups, and if β > 0, members of asocial groups
migrate back to social groups (since social groups cannot discriminate by type, we
assume immigrants have the same fraction of reciprocators as the asocial groups
from which they came). We shall assume the more plausible case that social groups
are sufficiently fit that no post-ostracism immigration is need to maintain group size;
i.e., β ≤ 0.6 Stationarity of f ∗ and f∗ require that the composition of immigrants
to the group be identical to the composition of those ostracised, the latter being just
the ratio of the shirking probability of reciprocators to the average shirking rate in
the social groups or
σr
f∗ = f ∗
(15)
σ
(we prove this result in the Appendix). As σr < σ , (15) shows that the equilibrium
frequency of reciprocators in asocial groups is less than their frequency in social
groups.
6 Our results continue to hold when β > 0 if β is not too large, but we believe that this case is

implausible and do not consider it further.
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Now let φr and φn be the average fitness of reciprocators and non-reciprocators
in the population. We can then derive a replicator dynamic, as in (7), now defined at
the population rather than the group level. The replicator equation for the fraction
of reciprocators in the population is given by,
dτ
= τ (1 − τ )(φr − φn ),
dt

(16)

from which we see that stationarity of τ ∈ (0, 1) requires that φr = φn ; i.e.,
population-average fitnesses of reciprocators and non-reciprocators must be equal.
We obtain the expression for φr as follows. Let αr be the fraction of reciprocators
who are in social groups, then
φr = αr φrs + (1 − αr )φa .

(17)

Similarly, if αn is the fraction of non-reciprocators who are in social groups, we
have
φn = αn φns + (1 − αn )φa .
(18)
Moreover if f ∗ and f∗ are at their equilibrium values, αr and αn are determined by
the distribution of the population between the social and asocial group, so we have
αr =

αf ∗
,
αf ∗ + (1 − α)f∗

αn =

α(1 − f ∗ )
,
α(1 − f ∗ ) + (1 − α)(1 − f∗ )

(19)

where, as before, α is the fraction of the total population in social groups. The
fitness of the two types in social groups is the number of members of the population
contributed by each member of the group minus one or the post ostracism rate of
growth of the group (−β) plus the per person contribution to the population outside
the group (by ostracism). Thus we have
φrs = σr ν − β,

φns = ν − β,

(20)

where ν = f ∗ npµ is the rate at which shirkers are ostracized from social groups.
From this it can be seen that the fitness of the reciprocators is lower: the two types
contribute equally to the groups population (because f is stationary) while the
non-reciprocators contribute more to the larger population.
Substituting these expressions in (17) and (18) and solving for the equilibrium
condition φr = φn , we find that
αn
νσr − β − φa
= ,
νσ − β − φa
αr

(21)

which requires that the relative fitness disadvantage of the reciprocators in social
groups—the left side of (21)—be offset by the fitness disadvantage imposed on
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1.0
αn /αr
r

νσr −β−φa
ν−β−φa

f∗ (1−f s)
f ∗ (1−f∗ )

τ̇ > 0

τ̇ < 0
α

∗

1.0

α

Figure 3: Population Level Equilibrium

non-reciprocators by their disproportionate location in asocial groups, given by the
right side of (21).
The variables in (21) are completely determined by the parameter values underlying the within-group equilibrium, except for αn /αr , which rises monotonically
in α, attaining a value of unity when all individuals are in social groups. Thus
(21) determines the equilibrium fraction of the population in social groups, as is
illustrated in Figure 3. In the figure the distance 1 − αn /αr is the advantage enjoyed by reciprocators by dint of their favorable distribution among groups, while
1 − (νσr − β − φa )/(νσ − β − φa ) is the fitness disadvantage of reciprocators in
social groups arising from their propensity to engage in costly monitoring and to
work hard. The equilibrium value of α is
α∗ =

ν(1 −

−(β + φa )
.
− sr )) − β − φa

f ∗ (1

(22)

This expression is always less than unity, and is strictly positive if
β < −φa .

(23)

The right hand side of (23) is strictly positive, so α ∗ ∈ (0, 1) given our assumptions
that β ≤ 0 and φa < 0.
Given α ∗ , the equilibrium distribution of types in the population is also determined, as the distribution of types within the asocial and social groups is unchanging.
From (13) we have
τ ∗ = α ∗ f ∗ + (1 − α ∗ )f∗ .
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The dynamics of the population frequency of reciprocators is illustrated by Figure 3.
For α > α ∗ the fitness disadvantage imposed on non-reciprocators by their disproportionate location in asocial groups falls short of their fitness advantages in social
groups, so dτ/dt < 0. When α = 1 they suffer no fitness disadvantage due to
their distribution among groups (all are in social groups), so their fitness advantage
in social groups is the only selective force at work. For analogous reasons, when
α < α ∗ the reverse is true. Because these results hold when α = 0, a small group
of mutant reciprocators would proliferate in a population of non-reciprocators.
Variable

Value

τ
α
αr
αn
f∗
φn
φr
φa
φrs
φns

0.800
0.968
0.973
0.947
0.670
0.090
0.090
-0.100
0.095
0.100

Description
Population Frequency of Reciprocators
Fraction of Population in Social Groups
Fraction of Reciprocators in Social Groups
Fraction of Non-Reciprocators in Social Groups
Frequency of Reciprocators in Asocial Groups
Average Fitness of Non-Reciprocators in Population
Average Fitness of Reciprocators in Population
Fitness in Asocial Groups
Fitness of Reciprocators in Social Groups
Fitness of Non-Reciprocators in Social Groups

Figure 4: Reciprocators and Non-Reciprocators in Population Level Equilibrium. The parameter values used to generate the equilibrium are identical to those in the notes of Figure 2.

The population-level equilibrium supported by the parameter values used in the
example of the within-group equilibrium (Figure 2) is shown in Figure 4. In this
example most agents are in social groups, with the asocial status representing a
temporary condition of those ostracized from social groups before relocating in a
social group. Like the heterogeneity of the social groups and the high frequency of
shirking illustrated in Figure 2, this aspect of our example may accurately reflect
empirical realities in the relevant populations.
We then have
Theorem 2. There is a unique equilibrium fraction of reciprocators τ ∗ > 0. This
equilibrium is stable in the replicator dynamic given by (16).
Corollary 2.1. A small number of reciprocators can invade a large population of
non-reciprocators.
To prove the theorem notice that α ∗ > 0 implies τ ∗ > 0 because social groups
are unsustainable without reciprocators. But it is easily to show that α ∈ (0, 1),
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because β+φa < 0. Let us write g(α) = αn /αr and g ∗ = (νσr −β−φa )(ν−β−φa ).
Then τ ∗ = α ∗ f ∗ + (1 − α ∗ )f∗ , where α ∗ is the solution to g(α) = g ∗ . We have
g ∗ − g(0) =

−(f ∗ − f∗ )(β + φa )
,
(1 − f∗ )f ∗ (ν − β − φa )

which is strictly positive if β + φa < 0. But if g ∗ > g(0) then dτ/dt > 0 by (16).
Moreover g(1) = 1 > g ∗ , so by the mean value theorem there exists an α ∗ ∈ (0, 1)
satisfying g(α ∗ ) = g ∗ . Also
g (α) =

(f ∗ − f∗ )(1 − f ∗ )
> 0,
f ∗ (1 − f∗ + αf∗ − αf ∗ )2

so g(α) is strictly increasing, implying that α ∗ is unique. Finally, since τ is a strictly
increasing function of α, the equilibrium at α ∗ is clearly stable in (16). The corollary
is true because g ∗ > g(0).

5 The Evolution of Reciprocity
Can this model illuminate a process by which strong reciprocity might have become
common in human populations? Do the interactions modeled here capture the
relevant aspects of the social and physical environments of Homo sapiens sapiens
during the past 200,000 to 50,000 years?7 To answer this question we turn to recent
and contemporary accounts of societies generally thought to resemble the foraging
bands that were common during this period, among them the !Kung of Botswana and
Namibia, the Ache of Paraguay, Batek of Malaysia, Hadza of Tanzania, Pandaram
and Paliyan of South India, the Inuit of the Northwest territories, and the Mbuti
Pygmies of Zaire. On the basis of this reading, we believe that our model may be
illuminating.8 There is evidence that in some contemporary simple societies the lazy
and the stingy are punished. Balikci (1970):177 reports the following concerning
the Netsilik, an isolated tribe of Arctic hunters living on the Arctic coast:
…there is a general rule…according to which all able bodied men
should contribute to hunting, and the returns of the hunt should be
7 This is the time span of anatomically modern humans reported by Klein (1989):344. Foley’s
(1987):22 estimate is 100,000 years. The horticultural societies that eventually replaced foraging
bands almost everywhere appeared 12-10,000 years ago. Even Klein’s lower limit for the appearance
of modern humans leaves ample time for significant change in gene distributions to have taken place
under the kinds of selection pressures at work.
8 Our main sources are listed in footnote 3. The difficulty in making inferences about simple
societies during the late Pleistocene on the basis of contemporary simple societies is stressed by Foley
(1987):75-78 and Kelly (1995).

April 14, 2000

Evolution of Strong Reciprocity

17

shared according to established custom. Any activity in exception to
this rule was bound to provoke criticism, various forms of conflict, and
frequently social ostracism. (176)…lazy hunters were barely tolerated
by the community. They were the objects of back biting and ostracism…until the opportunity came for an open quarrel. Stingy men who
shared in a niggardly manner were treated similarly. (177)
And Lee (1979):458 reports that
The most serious accusations one !Kung can level against another are
the charge of stinginess and the charge of arrogance. To be stingy, or
far-hearted, is to hoard one’s goods jealously and secretively, guarding
them “like a hyena.” The corrective for this is to make the hoarder
give “till it hurts”; that is to make him give generously and without
stint until everyone can see that he is truly cleaned out. In order to
ensure compliance with this cardinal rule the !Kung browbeat each
other constantly to be more generous and not to hoard.
Lethal violence among the !Kung is quite high so the costs of these conflicts
must sometimes be borne by those seeking to uphold norms of sharing (Lee 1979).9
More extensive evidence of punishment of norm violators is provided by Christopher
Boehm’s (1993) survey of the many studies in this area.
…intentional leveling linked to an egalitarian ethos is an immediate and
probably an extremely widespread cause of human societies’ failing to
develop authoritative or coercive leadership. (226)
Bruce Knauft (1991):393,395 adds:
In all ethnographically known simple societies, cooperative sharing of
provisions is extended to mates, offspring, and many others within the
band. …This sharing takes place well outside the range of immediate
kin, viz. among the diverse array of kin and non-kin who constitute
the typical residence group of 25+ persons. Archeological evidence
suggests that widespread networks facilitating diffuse access to and
transfer of resources and information have been pronounced at least
since the Upper Paleolithic…The strong internalization of a sharing
ethic is in many respects the sine qua non of culture in these societies.
9 By contrast to the reports of Lee and Balikci, however, Endicott (1988):118 reports horror ex-

pressed by a Batek informant at the thought of exiling a member whose laziness had caused some
resentment.
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Using data from forty-eight surviving simple societies, Boehm (1993):228 concluded that
the primary and most immediate cause of egalitarian behavior is a
moralistic determination on the part of a local group’s main political
actors that no one of its members should be allowed to dominate the
others.
Boehm further sought to determine whether intentional behavior (notably, social
sanctioning) that had a leveling effect was widespread in such societies and more
specifically whether it had any significant effects in suppressing the growth of
authoritarian leadership. He found evidence that arrogant members of the group
are constrained by public opinion, criticism and ridicule, disobedience, and extreme
sanction:
…assassination is reported in 11 out of the 48.…behaviors that terminated relations with an overly assertive individual or removed him from
a leadership role involved 38 of the 48 societies, while in an additional
28 instances the person was manipulated by social pressure.…the great
majority of these misbehaviors involve dominance or self-assertion.
(231)
among simple foragers, …group execution of overassertive persons
seems to be rather frequent. (239)
We have modelled punishment simply as ostracism from the group. But in the
ethnographic record it takes several forms, including group fissioning to minimize
interacting with shirkers and the withdrawal of cooperation from shirkers who remain co-resident. Extensions of the model to include these forms of punishment
are straightforward. An excluded subgroup of shirkers, for example, would most
likely have too few reciprocators to sustain the social equilibrium, and would simply become an asocial group, thus reproducing the effects of our individual level
ostracism.
Our reading of the ethnographic and paleoanthropological evidence is that our
model may capture the salient social and ecological conditions of the late Pleistocene. This alone is not adequate, of course, for we must also show that the
model can account for the proliferation of reciprocators in a population composed
of non-reciprocators, as our ancestral populations undoubtedly were.
Such a population, a small fraction of whom are reciprocators, we will suppose,
initially occupy positions in asocial groups, all experiencing the same level of fitness.
If the many asocial groups are forming and dissolving by random draws from the
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population, one, by chance will have a distribution of types within the basin of
attraction of f ∗ . It will then evolve as a social group with its equilibrium distribution
of reciprocators. At this point we know that the members of this sole social group
constitute a small fraction of the population so α < α∗ and the average fitness of
reciprocators, by (21), exceeds that of non-reciprocators, resulting in the growth of
the population of the social group, which either sends migrants back to the asocial
group or eventually divides. This process will continue until a sufficiently large
number of social groups are in existence that at size n, their members constitute
α ∗ of the population, at which point dτ/dt = 0 and the population equilibrium we
have described in Section 4 obtains.10

6

Conclusion

Other cases of costly enforcement of norms relevant to the model arise because
its application is considerably more general than the case of working and shirking
with which we have motivated it. Suitably emended, the model covers many generic
cases of adherence to group-beneficial norms, and punishment for violation of these
norms. The extension from team production to the sharing of food acquired individually has already been mentioned and is readily accomplished. A more ambitious
extension is to the norm of monogamy, which if possible would considerably expand
the scope of our model by encompassing what appears to be a quite common norm
in hunter gather bands and a frequent occasion for the sanctioning of violators.
Suppose there is norm that restricts copulations to monogamous couples, which
when violated leads to strife within a group or lessens its effectiveness in acquiring
food, insuring against stochastic events, or defending itself, all of which reduce
fitness levels of group members. Those who violate the norm, however, enhance
their fitness by an amount b. Let σ represent the fraction of those in the group
violating the norm of monogamy, with σr and σn the fraction of reciprocators and
non-reciprocators, respectively, violating the norm and suppose the group fitness
costs of violations of the norm are simply linear in σ . In the absence of monitoring
and ostracism, then, we have
φn = q(1 − σ ) − b(1 − σn )
φr = q(1 − σ ) − b(1 − σr ),
where q −b is just the fitness level in a group uniformly conforming to the norm with,
as before q > b, so adherence to the norm is group beneficial. If we assume, as be10 We do not address the manner in which a small group of reciprocators might constitute a group

and establish group norms except note that the process could easily come about simply by an extension
to non-kin of common within-kin group practices (Boehm 1999).
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fore that reciprocators are motivated both to observe the norm themselves () and to
punish those who fail to observe it, we reproduce the working-shirking-monitoring
model exactly. We are thus confident that the model as we have developed it is
applicable to a wide range of concrete problems of norm adherence likely to arise
in small stateless groups.
We should stress, however, that any claim that strong reciprocity historically
evolved by the mechanism we have identified remains entirely speculative. We are
content to have shown that it could have. Moreover the mechanism underlying our
model, while plausible, might be vulnerable to the emergence of actors who work
( > 0) but do not punish violators (ρ = 0). We do not regard this possibility
as decisive for two reasons. First, the traits supporting adherence and punishment
( and ρ) might be pleiotropically linked, the mutations effectively delinking the
traits having either not occurred in this particular branch of hominids, or proven
non-viable due to group extinctions among those experiencing these mutations, or
for other reasons outside the model.11 Second the cognitive and affective traits
required to fashion, learn, detect violations of, and wish to uphold social norms
may be genetically transmitted, while the content of the norms (and in particular the
linking of  and ρ) may be culturally transmitted. For example, one’s unwillingness
to join in the punishment of a norm violator (which according to Boehm (1993) is
often collective and hence public) would itself be punished. Notice that this possible
cultural linking of norm adherence and the punishment of violators does not trivialize
the problem, as the fundamental puzzle remains, namely how could this individually
costly mélange of behaviors overcome its fitness disadvantage within groups?
In sum, we think that the model, suitably extended to cover generic norm adherence and to accommodate movement between groups as well as group dissolution
and formation, may adequately account for those fitness determining individual
interactions in groups during the late Pleistocene.
We do not know that a human predisposition to strong reciprocity evolved as we
have described. But it might well have. Our results convince us that an evolutionary
process based on genetic inheritance under the influence of natural selection is
capable of accounting for the considerable extent of strong reciprocity observed
in contemporary society. If we are right, the experimental, historical and other
evidence of strong reciprocity may appear to be expressions of human propensities
rather than puzzling behaviors inviting ad hoc explanation.

11 Pleiotropic linking of traits is not merely a fortuitous possibility, but in fact is a likely evolutionary
outcome in a situation where two traits separately are deleterious but together are fitness enhancing.
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Appendix

Proposition 1. Suppose pρ > c, b > q/n, and b − q/n < . The following cases
are nonempty and exhaustive.
(a) If f < gn /(nps + ) then σ = σr = σn = 1 and µ = 0. This is the asocial
region members shirk and no member monitors.
(b) If f < gn /nps, f < 1−c/pρ, and gn / < f , then σn = 1, σr = 0, σ = 1−f
and µ = 1. This is an equilibrium in which non-reciprocators surely shirk,
reciprocators never shirk, and reciprocators monitor with certainty.
(c) If gn /nps < f < 1 − c/pρ, then µ = gn /f nps, σr = 0, σn = c/pρ(1 − f ),
σ = c/pρ. In this equilibrium reciprocators never shirk, but non-reciprocators
work with positive probability, and reciprocators monitor with positive probability.
(d) If gn /(nps + ) < f < gn / and f > 1 − c/pρ, then σn = 1,


1 c
σr =
− (1 − f ) ,
f pρ

(24)

so σ = c/pρ and µ = gr /f nps. The is the social region in which nonreciprocators do not work and reciprocators have positive shirking, while
monitoring with less than certainty.
(e) If gn / < f , f > 1 − c/pρ then σn = 1, σr = 0, σ = 1 − f and µ = 0. This
is the unconditional cooperation region, in which reciprocators never shirk
and never monitor, while non-reciprocators shirk with certainty.
Proof: First, if µ, the probability that a reciprocator monitors, is chosen to be a best
response, we have

c > σpρ
 = 0,
µ ∈ [0, 1], c = σpρ
(25)

= 1,
c < σpρ
Finally, if σr and σn are chosen as best responses to µ, we have
 f nµps < g
σ =1
r



σr ∈ [0, 1], σn = 1
 gr = f nµps
gr < f nµps < gn σr = 0, σn = 1


σr = 0, σn ∈ [0, 1]

 f nµps = gn
gn < f nµps
σ r = σn = 0

(26)
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(a) For any µ ≤ 1 we have f nµps < gr < gn , so σ = σr = σn = 1. But then
µ = 0 since by assumption reciprocators only monitor when there is positive
working.
(b) Suppose first that gn /(nps + ) < f . Since f nµps < gn , for any µ ≤ 1, we
have σn = 1. Suppose µ = 0. Then gr = gn − f > gn − f nps > 0, so
σr = 1 But σn = 1, so σ = 1, so µ = 1, a contradiction. Suppose 0 < µ < 1.
Then σ = c/pρ, so σr is given by (24), which is negative, since c/pρ < 1 − f .
This is a contradiction, proving that µ = 1. But then gr < f nµps, so σr = 0.
Now suppose gn / < f . Then γr < 0 so σr = 0. Moreover f nsp < gn , so
f npsµ < gn , so σn = 1. Hence σ = 1 − f , which implies µ = 1.
(c) If µ = 1, then gr < gn < f nµps, so σ = 0, which implies µ = 0, a
contradiction. Suppose µ = 0. Then if f < gn /, we have gr > 0, so σr = 1,
so σ = 1, so µ = 1, a contradiction. If f > gn /, then gn < f µ = f <
f nps, so σn = 0, so σ = 0, so µ = 0, a contradiction. Thus 0 < µ < 1, so
σ = c/pρ. If σr > 0, then σn = 1 (if reciprocators are indifferent to working or
shirking, or if reciprocators surely shirk, then non-reciprocators surely shirk).
But then c/pρ = σ > (1 − f )σn = 1 − f , which violates our assumption that
c/pρ < 1 − f . Thus σr = 0, so sn = σ/(1 − f ) = c/pρ(1 − f ).
(d) Note that f < gn / implies gr > 0. Suppose first that f nps < gn . Then
f nµps < gn , so for any µ ≤ 1, we have σn = 1. If µ = 1, then gr < f nµps,
so σr = 0. Then σ = 1 − f , so pρσ = pρ(1 − f ) < c, so µ = 0, a
contradiction. Hence µ < 1. If µ = 0, then σ = 1, since gr > 0, so pρσ > c,
so µ = 1, a contradiction. Hence 0 < µ < 1, so σ = c/pρ. Then σr is given
by (24), which is positive, since c/pρ > 1 − f .
Now suppose gn < f nps. Then if µ = 1, then gr < gn < f nµps, so σ = 0,
which implies µ = 0, a contradiction. If µ = 0, then σ = 1, since gr > 0,
so µ = 1, a contradiction. Thus 0 < µ < 1, so σ = c/pρ. If σr = 0 then
σ = (1 − f )σn ≤ 1 − f < c/pρ = σ , a contradiction. Thus σr > 0, which
implies, as in the previous paragraph, σn = 1, so σr is given by (24), which is
positive, less than unity. But then µ = gr /f nps.
(e) Since f > gn /, gr < 0 so σr = 0. The cost of monitoring is nc and the
expected gain satisfies
(1 − f )npρσn ≤ (1 − f )npρ < (c/pρ)npρ = cn.
Hence we must have µ = 0. Thus σn = 1 and the rest follows.
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The intuition underlying the is illustrated by the depiction of the theorem’s
five cases in Figure 5. For case (a), where values of f are less than gn /(nps +
), the payoff to shirking for the reciprocators exceeds the expected cost when
all reciprocators monitor (4), so reciprocators shirk and, a fortiori, so do nonreciprocators. For f slightly larger than this value (if the cost of monitoring is
low), we have case (b), where all reciprocators work and continue to monitor while
for f > gn /nps we have case (c), where non-reciprocators also work, while by
(25) the overall reduction in shirking induces reciprocators to reduce their level of
monitoring. However if the cost of monitoring, c, exceeds (1 − f )/pρ, monitoring
at level µ = 1 is no longer a best response, even when, as in case (d), all nonreciprocators are shirking, so reciprocators pursue a mixed strategy with respect to
both shirking and monitoring. Finally in case (e), where f > gn /, shirking is
no longer a best response for reciprocators, while the remaining shirkers (1 − f )n
are too few to motivate monitoring, so reciprocators work and do not monitor and
non-reciprocators shirk.
c
pρ

1

r

(a)

σn = 1
σr = f1

c
pρ

− 1 + f∗

σn = 1
σr = 0
µ=0

µ = gr /f nps

(a)

(d)

σ =1
µ=1

(e)

gn
nps+

σn = 1
σr = 0
µ=1

σr = 0
c
σn = pρ(1−f
∗)

(b)

µ = gr /f nps
(c)
gn
nps

c
pρ

=1−f
☛

(c)
gn


f

1

Figure 5: Case of Within-Group Interaction for Different Costs of Monitoring
and Frequency of Reciprocators (cases (a) through (e) refer to the
corresponding parts of Theorem 1). The figure assume nps > , so
one part of region (b) is not illustrated.

Figure 6 illustrates the relationship between the fraction of reciprocators and the
average level of shirking when monitoring costs are low (c/pρ < 1 − gn /). Notice
that shirking is complete in region (a), but when f moves into region (b), shirking
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falls discontinuously and declines monotonically until f is in region (c), after which
it remains constant until it reaches region (e), where shirking falls linearly to zero
as f goes to 1. Figure 7 illustrates the same relationship when monitoring costs
are higher (1 − gn / < c/pρ < 1 − gn /nps). Again shirking falls discontinuously
from region to region with increasing numbers of reciprocators. The remaining
cases are similar, except as c/pρ increases, first region (c) disappears, and region
(b) disappears.
σ
r
1r
r

σ =1−f
r

c
pρ

r
Region (a)

r

Region (b)

gn
nps+

r

Region (c)

gn
nps

1−

Region (e)

c
pρ

r

f

1

Figure 6: Relationship of Average Shirking to Fraction of Reciprocators with
low monitoring costs (c/pρ < 1 − gn /).
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Figure 7: Relationship of Average Shirking to Fraction of Reciprocators with
higher monitoring costs (1 − gn / < c/pρ < 1 − gn /nps).
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Figure 8 illustrates the relationship between the fraction of reciprocators on the
one hand, and the monitoring rate by reciprocators and total monitoring on the other,
in the case of low monitoring costs c/pρ. Notice that the total material resources
devoted to monitoring (f nµc) increases through regions (a) and (b), then declines
as f increases through the remaining regions. Similar results hold for higher values
of c/pρ.
µ
r
r
1r
µ=
µf =

r

r

r

r
r

Region (a)

Region (b)

gn
nps+

Region (c)

gn
nps

r

1−

Region (e)

c
pρ

r

1

Figure 8: Monitoring Rate (µ) and total monitoring (f µ).

Proof of Theorem 1: First, if µ, the probability that a reciprocator monitors, is
chosen to be a best response, we have

c > σpρ
 = 0,
µ ∈ [0, 1], c = σpρ
(27)

= 1,
c < σpρ
Finally, if σr and σn are chosen as best responses to µ, we have
 f nµps < g
r



=
f
nµps
g
 r
gr < f nµps < gn


f

 nµps = gn
gn < f nµps

σ =1
σr ∈ [0, 1], σn = 1
σr = 0, σn = 1
σr = 0, σn ∈ [0, 1]
σ r = σn = 0

(28)

(a) For any µ ≤ 1 we have f nµps < gr < gn , so σ = σr = σn = 1. But then
c < pρσ implies µ = 1.
(b) Suppose first that gn /(nps + ) < f . Since f nµps < gn , for any µ ≤ 1, we
have σn = 1. Suppose µ = 0. Then gr = gn − f > gn − f nps > 0, so
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σr = 1 But σn = 1, so σ = 1, so µ = 1, a contradiction. Suppose 0 < µ < 1.
Then σ = c/pρ, so σr is given by (24), which is negative, since c/pρ < 1 − f .
This is a contradiction, proving that µ = 1. But then gr < f nµps, so σr = 0.
Now suppose gn / < f . Then γr < 0 so σr = 0. Moreover f nsp < gn , so
f npsµ < gn , so σn = 1. Hence σ = 1 − f , which implies µ = 1.
(c) If µ = 1, then gr < gn < f nµps, so σ = 0, which implies µ = 0, a
contradiction. Suppose µ = 0. Then if f < gn /, we have gr > 0, so σr = 1,
so σ = 1, so µ = 1, a contradiction. If f > gn /, then gn < f µ = f <
f nps, so σn = 0, so σ = 0, so µ = 0, a contradiction. Thus 0 < µ < 1, so
σ = c/pρ. If σr > 0, then σn = 1 (if reciprocators are indifferent to working or
shirking, or if reciprocators surely shirk, then non-reciprocators surely shirk).
But then c/pρ = σ > (1 − f )σn = 1 − f , which violates our assumption that
c/pρ < 1 − f . Thus σr = 0, so sn = σ/(1 − f ) = c/pρ(1 − f ).
(d) Note that f < gn / implies gr > 0. Suppose first that f nps < gn . Then
f nµps < gn , so for any µ ≤ 1, we have σn = 1. If µ = 1, then gr < f nµps,
so σr = 0. Then σ = 1 − f , so pρσ = pρ(1 − f ) < c, so µ = 0, a
contradiction. Hence µ < 1. If µ = 0, then σ = 1, since gr > 0, so pρσ > c,
so µ = 1, a contradiction. Hence 0 < µ < 1, so σ = c/pρ. Then σr is given
by (24), which is positive, since c/pρ > 1 − f .
Now suppose gn < f nps. Then if µ = 1, then gr < gn < f nµps, so σ = 0,
which implies µ = 0, a contradiction. If µ = 0, then σ = 1, since gr > 0,
so µ = 1, a contradiction. Thus 0 < µ < 1, so σ = c/pρ. If σr = 0 then
σ = (1 − f )σn ≤ 1 − f < c/pρ = σ , a contradiction. Thus σr > 0, which
implies, as in the previous paragraph, σn = 1, so σr is given by (24), which is
positive, less than unity. But then µ = gr /f nps.
(e) Since f > gn /, gr < 0 so σr = 0. The cost of monitoring is nc and the
expected gain satisfies
(1 − f )npρσn ≤ (1 − f )npρ < (c/pρ)npρ = cn.
Hence we must have µ = 0. Thus σn = 1 and the rest follows.
Proof of equation (15). For simplicity of exposition we assume β ≥ 0, leaving
the (easier) case β < 0 aside. We first develop a differential equation expressing the movement of fa,t , the fraction of reciprocators in asocial groups
at time t (we assume all have the same composition of reciprocators and nonreciprocators), Let ν be the rate at which shirkers are ostracized from social
groups, and let σr be the rate at which reciprocators shirk in social groups (all
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non-reciprocators shirk with certainty). Then if µ is the monitoring rate in
social groups, using (11) and Theorem 1d, we have
ν = f ∗ npµ =

b(1 − σ )
gr
=
s
(1 + s)(1 − σ ) − ρσ

(29)

where σ = c/pρ, and the total number of ostracized from a single group,
including shirking reciprocators, is
nν[1 − f + f σr ] = nνσ.
Let α be the fraction of the population in social groups. From the above, we
see that at time t + t the number of reciprocators in asocial groups after
immigration and emigration is
fa,t (1 − α)N(1 + φa t) + αN (f ∗ νσr − βfa,t )t.

(30)

and the total number of members of asocial groups at time t + t is given
by the fitness φa of individual in asocial groups plus migrants ostracized from
social groups minus emigrants, or
(1 − α)N (1 + φa t) + αN (νσ − β)t.

(31)

Dividing (30) by (31), subtracting fa,t , dividing by t and passing to the limit,
we find that the fraction f∗ of agents in asocial groups who are reciprocators
satisfies the differential equation
ανσ
(fa,t − f∗ ),
f˙a,t = −
1−α
where

(32)

σr
(33)
σ
is the equilibrium fraction of reciprocators in asocial groups, which requires
that the ratio of reciprocators ostracized from social groups to all of those
ostracized be equal to the ratio of reciprocators in asocial groups.
f∗ = f ∗

We shall now prove that when the whole population is constant in size when in
equilibrium, then we must have β = 0. We treat φrs and φns as parameters, and solve
(17), (18), (19) and (20) for the equilibrium condition φr = φn , getting
α=

f ∗ (φrs − φa ) + f∗ (φa − (f ∗ φrs + (1 − f ∗ )φns ))
.
(f ∗ − f∗ )((f ∗ φrs + (1 − f ∗ )φns ) − φa )

(34)
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The equation for zero total population growth is
α(f ∗ φrs + (1 − f ∗ )φns ) + (1 − α)φa = 0,
which has solution
α=

−φa
.
f ∗ φrs + (1 − f ∗ )φns − φa

(35)

(36)

The condition for both (35) and (36) to hold is
f∗ =

f ∗ φrs
.
f ∗ φrs + (1 − f ∗ )φns

(37)

In equilibrium f∗ satisfies (15) which, when substituted in (37) and simplified, give
φrs = φns σr .

(38)

comparing this with (20), we see that β = 0.
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